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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, / 
vs. / 
AZER FRANKLIN BILLS, / Case No. 20031028-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES now Defendant/Appellant above-named, by and through his attorneys of 
record, and pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure submits the 
following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A.§ 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in not granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of a warrantless seizure of the Defendant when neither the traffic stop 
nor the arrest was supported by probable cause? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4 (Utah 1994). The trial court's conclusions of law based on 
its factual findings are reviewed "for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to 
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 
1245, 1247 (Utah App. 1996). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
On October 20, 2003, Defendant/Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge 
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The plea was entered 
under the conditions of the Court's decision in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 398-38 (Utah 
App. 1997). Defendant/Appellant thus preserved his right to appeal the denial of his 
Motion to Suppress. (See R. 086-095) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-2, which states: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant 
or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence 
of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses 
or any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any 
physical sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
2 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 2002, Defendant was charged with distribution of a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Both 
charges were second degree felonies and were filed in the Second Judicial District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah. (R. 001-006). On the same day, Defendant entered a 
plea of not guilty. (R. 010-011) 
On October 21, 2002, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson presided at Defendant's 
preliminary hearing. (R. 019-020) Judge Dutson bound Defendant over for trial, and he 
was arraigned. (R.021-022) 
A pre-trial conference was held on December 16, 2002. The trial date, initially set 
for January of 2003, was stricken, and the case was set for disposition. (R. 027-028) 
On March 5, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to suppress and a supporting 
memorandum of points and authorities. (R. 031-037) This motion was supplemented 
with an addendum filed March 19, 2003. (R. 049-051) The State filed two responses, 
one on filed March 31, 2003 (R. 052-055) and one on May 30. (R. 060-066) 
Oral argument was held May 30, 2003. (R. 067-069). Following the hearing, 
Judge Dutson denied the motion to suppress. (R. 069) The State prepared Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law based on Judge Dutson's ruling, which were executed by 
the judge on July 11, 2003. (R. 076-069, attached as Appendix A) 
On October 20, 2003, Defendant plead guilty to the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute. In exchange for this plea, the State 
moved to dismiss the remaining charge. Defendant's plea was entered conditionally, 
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R. 086-087) A written 
plea statement was filed on October 22, 2003. (R. 088-095) 
On December 1, 2003, Defendant was sentenced to 1-15 years in the Utah State 
Prison. This term was stayed pending completion of 365 days in jail, 3 years' probation, 
and payment of a fine. (R. 096-099) On December 10, 2003, Defendant filed his Notice 
of Appeal. (R. 101-103) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are taken from the transcript of Defendant's preliminary 
hearing, a copy of which is attached to this brief as Appendix B. 
1. On July 1, 2002, Agent Ryan Read of the Weber County Sheriffs office 
arranged for a confidential informant to purchase drugs from Defendant. 
(TR 6:6-17) 
2. The informant's name was Jody Dutra. Ms. Dutra had been charged with 
possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. (TR 37:25 -
38:1) Ms. Dutra had an arrangement with the police that her charges would 
be reduced if she helped them catch others. (TR 38:4-6) 
3. Ms. Dutra had told Agent Read that she would purchase marijuana from 
Defendant. (TR 8:8-12) Agent Read had Ms. Dutra call Defendant and ask 
to buy marijuana. (TR 8:17-20.) When Ms. Dutra got off the phone, she 
told Agent Read that the transaction would take place at the Super Saver. 
(TR 9:14-17.) 
4. Agent Read searched Ms. Dutra to make sure that she was not carrying any 
contraband, and he provided her with an electronic listening device and 
money. (TR 10:9-20) The search consisted of Agent Read checking Ms. 
Dutra's pockets and bra; he did not pat her down or check her groin area. 
(TR 41:12-22). 
5. Agent Todd Hardman then accompanied Ms. Dutra to the Super Saver at 
675 North Monroe in Ogden. (TR 10:9-20; TR 11:7-11.) Agent Read does 
not know when Agent Hardman's vehicle was last searched, although it is 
frequently used for undercover buys. (TR 45:15-22) 
6. Agent Read, who was providing surveillance at the location, saw Ms. Dutra 
meet the Defendant. Agent Read had never seen the Defendant prior to that 
time, but identified him in the courtroom. (TR 12:4-20) Agent Read's 
location was about 50 yards away from Ms. Dutra. (TR 48:9-11) 
7. Agent Read was unable to see anything passed between Ms. Dutra and the 
Defendant, and he could not hear the conversation because the reception on 
the listening device was poor. (TR 13:8-23.) 
8. During the conversation, another female pulled up in a vehicle next to Ms. 
Dutra and Defendant. Agent Read believes he would have seen any 
exchange between this third person and either Ms. Dutra or Defendant. 
(TR 14:6-21.) 
9. After the meeting, Ms. Dutra got back in the car with Agent Hardman and 
drove to another location to meet Agent Read. (TR 16:8-16.) 
10. Ms. Dutra gave Agent Read a bag full of a green leafy suspect allegedly 
purchased from Defendant for $80.00. (TR 16:18-25.) 
11. The bag Ms. Dutra gave Agent Read contained 10 grams of marijuana and 
was approximately one inch wide by four inches long. Agent Read 
admitted it could have been hidden in Ms. Dutra's crotch. (TR 42:9-21) 
12. On September 17, 2002, Agent Read saw Defendant driving and recognized 
his car. He stopped Defendant on 27th Street between Adams and 
Washington. (TR 23:25 - 24:25) 
13. Agent Read approached Defendant's vehicle and asked him for 
identification. Defendant responded that he didn't have any. Agent Read 
was "pretty sure" Defendant was the one he had seen in the parking lot in 
July, so he asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle and arrested him. 
(TR 25:21-24; TR 48:23-25.) 
14. Following the arrest, Agent Read searched Defendant's car. He found a 
marijuana butt between the two front seats. Behind the passenger seat was 
a box containing a large quantity of marijuana. (TR 26:19 - 27: 4) 
15. Agent Read gave Defendant his Miranda rights from memory. (TR 26:15-
21) In answer to his questions, Defendant admitted that the marijuana was 
his. Defendant said that it had been given to him by a friend who owed 
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him $600 to satisfy the debt and that it was for his personal use. (TR 29:1-
7) 
16. Agent Read believed the marijuana was actually for distribution because of 
the large amount. (TR 29:12-14) 
17. Between the July 1 incident ant Defendant's arrest on September 17, Agent 
Read never requested a search warrant or an arrest warrant. (TR 46:22-25) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Probable cause is required to stop an automobile under the Fourth Amendment. 
Probable cause did not exist in this case because Defendant had committed no traffic 
violation, nor was there reliable information to establish that Defendant had committed a 
crime. The only information available to the police was that they had observed 
Defendant meet with Ms. Dutra, and Ms. Dutra claimed that a drug sale had taken place. 
However, it is undisputed that Ms. Dutra was not thoroughly searched prior to the 
meeting, that a third individual was present for part of the meeting, that no officer saw or 
heard the alleged transaction, and that Ms. Dutra had a motive to fabricate because she 
was trying to buy down her own drug charges by operating as a confidential informant. 
There was no warrant for Defendant's arrest, and at the time of the stop Agent Read was 
unsure whether it was even Defendant who was driving the vehicle. 
Similarly, once Defendant's vehicle was stopped, there was no probable cause to 
justify Defendant's warrantless arrest. A warrantless arrest may be made if the officer 
has personally perceived an offense or if there is reliable information from a third party 
regarding the offense. The information from Ms. Dutra is inherently unreliable, a 
7 
position that is supported by the fact that Agent Read never pursued the case or 
performed any further investigation to corroborate her story. 
Finally, even if the events of July 1 constituted probable cause to arrest Defendant, 
the failure to pursue the arrest in due diligence constituted a due process violation that 
nullified the validity of the arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT WAS 
UNSUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE, 
It is well settled that stopping an automobile constitutes a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). 
In order for a stop to pass Fourth Amendment muster, the State must establish one of two 
criteria: (1) the stop was incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence; or (2) the stop was based on specific, articulable facts that would lead a 
reasonable officer to conclude that the occupant of the vehicle had committed or was 
about to commit a crime. State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, it is undisputed that there was no traffic violation. The stop was based 
on the incident observed by Agent Read almost three months earlier. This incident did 
not give rise to probable cause to stop Defendant for three reasons. 
First, Agent Read was unsure whether it was actually Defendant in the car and 
whether Defendant was the same individual he had seen during the July meeting. Agent 
Read thought he recognized Defendant's car, and he had the license plate verified. 
8 
However, once he stopped Defendant and approached the car, he was uncertain that it 
A'.is ill lad., 1 k'lendnnl \\\v\\\ UCAA li.inl lr • :k ^ L In ".i.l.i iv\\\ his iduihl /. 
Second, the facts surrounding the July meeting were not enough to establish that a 
crime had been committed. Agent Read never saw anything actually change hands at the 
meeting. Agent R eacl also saw a tliii dpai t) joii i the meeting and cannot say conclusively 
that the third party did not conduct the alleged transaction. Further, \yy\\\ Rend l.uli d In 
conduct a HUM ough search of Ms. Dutra and cannot verify that Ms. Dutra did not conceal 
the drugs on her own person ^tra certainly had a motivation to fabricate the sale. 
tier deal with the poli • » 1 
she was unable to do so, her value would be nil, and she would lose her plea bargain. 
Third, Agent Read did nothing to further investigate or verify Ms. Dutra's 
.hfnnrnl'., allhnuj'h lie irrlainl' li id inmpl'i linn in In sn helium lie Mopped Defendant. 
If an individual is stopped based on information obtained from a third party, the legality 
of the stop depends on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the officer. State 
v. Seel, 82 7 l\2<l 'n-l, "'(ill |i iijuii App.), cert denied 8J(J ; AJ . , > tah 1982). Here, 
all Agent Read knew was that a confidential informant told him h 
marijuana from Defendant several months before. 
Essent tally , < Vgeiit R eacl stopped Defendant based oi I "vv ho he might be and 
something he might ha\ e done tvv o and a l ialf i i ic nths earliei If 1:1 lis infor mation vere 
sufficient v detain Defendant, surely he would have been arrested months earlier. At a 
minimum, Agent Read would have continued to investigate the matter to obtain 
1
 :orrc >borating inf< n; i i I; it i< )n riii i fact till: \i i t h i Xx II • u : 1 Happened to see 
o 
someone he thought looked like Defendant suggests that even Agent Read felt that the 
information he had did not rise to the level of probable cause. 
II. THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO JUSTIFY 
DEFENDANT'S WARRANTLESS ARREST. 
Pursuant to § 77-7-2 of the Utah Code, an arrest may only be made without a 
warrant in certain circumstances, including: (1) when a public offense is committed or 
attempted in the presence of the officer; or (2) when the officer has reasonable cause to 
believe the arrested individual committed a felony or class A misdemeanor. Neither 
exception applies here. 
Agent Read never actually observed any offense taking place; all he saw was Ms. 
Dutra meet with Defendant. Agent Read also did not hear or in any other way perceive 
the alleged offense. His conclusion that a drug sale occurred is based entirely on Ms. 
Dutra5 s statement, which places this arrest in the second category. Defendant submits 
that Agent Read did not have reasonable cause to believe that a felony had been 
committed. 
The ultimate issue on any arrest is whether the arrest is supported by probable 
cause. State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Dunawav v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined probable cause in this context: 
Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within 
[the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable 
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. 
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State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 
3,381 J S li 50, r : '5 7 6 , 6 9 S C ' 1302, 131 3 11,93 1 E< 1 18' ; < • (1949)). 
Probable cause is an objective standard. It must be more than mere suspicion. 
Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226. The facts presented must K sufficient to establish that an 
iitfciisir lias been 11>niiiiittcil and. a reasonable belie; \\wi* the defendant committed it. 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT9at1f I I Ml I" M Mm (nnphasr. in <>in>iii;il I <i itafion niinlli ill 
Here, it is questionable whether any reasonable officer would have believed that an 
offense had taken piac^ ana Uuu Defendant had committed it. As argued above, Agent 
Read did ne ,;-.».. 
other investigation into the incident. A reasonable officer who believed that there was 
adequate evidence for an arrest would surely have pursued the matter. 
Defendant ; * ::n il : 1 it: efei this Coi it t to the case of State v. banks. J ) 
(Utah 1986). In Banks, a confidential informant purchased dr i - ? . * ' - - . i 
three separate occasions. After the buys, the officers conducted an extensive 
MIS estimation inlv Hanks s invoIvenient with drug trafficking and utilized this information 
to obtain a search warrant. W h e n e \ o iihin' llie WAU !I \\ inaiil imlhY I'nnnd M ^ rial I'mn 
(illegal because Banks was a restricted person) and drugs. I d at 1381-82. 
Banks, who had been detained in handcuffs immediately when the officers entered 
detention was deemed an arrest, it was supported by probable cause based upon the 
previous drug buys and investigation. Id. at 1383. 
The Banks case is an example of investigation to develop a case to establish 
probable cause and raise it beyond the level of mere suspicion. The officers in Banks 
conducted three separate buys, conducted an extensive background investigation, and 
searched the defendant's home prior to arresting him. By contrast, in the case at bar, all 
Agent Read did was observe a highly questionable meeting at which it was alleged that a 
drug buy occurred. There was no corroborating investigation, nor was there any evidence 
given regarding the reliability of the confidential informant in question. 
Defendant does not mean to suggest that every case requires as thorough an 
investigation as was performed in Banks. However, something beyond the scant contact 
here should be required. Waiting over 70 days to pursue an investigation, and then 
stopping a vehicle that just happened across his path does not suggest that anything is 
going on beyond suspicion. What most likely happened is that Agent Read wanted to 
search Defendant and his car and, lacking probable cause to do so, arrested Defendant so 
that he could conduct the search. 
III. EVEN IF PROBABLE CAUSE INITIALLY EXISTED, IT WAS 
STALE BY THE TIME DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED. 
Because the police failed to act with due diligence following the July incident, the 
questionable information it garnered had become stale and could not justify Defendant's 
subsequent arrest. In the context of an alleged probation violation, it is well settled that 
due process requires the State to act with due diligence to issue and execute an arrest 
warrant. See State v. Kahl 814P.2d 1151 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied 843 P.2d516 
(Utah 1992). Similar analysis was applied to a normal arrest in Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P. 
n 
i uih 1926). Oleson was an unlawful detention lawsuit where the plaintiff was 
; n ;i ame( i i< )t* sev ei all. 1 IC i n s bet >/ e en an alleged speeding < ' iolation and his actual arrest. 
In its ruling, the Supreme Court quoted 5 C.L 406 § 31: 
While peace officers are authorized to arrest without a warrant for offenses 
committed in their presence, it is usually held that, in order to be valid, the 
arrest must be made at the time the offense is committed, or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, or upon fresh and immediate pursuit of the offender 
The Court continued: 
No hard and fast rule can, however, be laid down which will fit every 
case respecting what constitutes a reasonable time. What may be so in 
one case under particular circumstances may not be so in another case 
under different circumstances. All that can be affirmed with safety is that 
the officer must act promptly in making the arrest, and as soon as possible 
under the circumstances, and before he transacts other business. 
I d at 26. 
A di i iittedJ)/ Oleson is a \ : i ] " • :)ld case, bi it it has never been overruled or 
commented on negatively. More recent case- ^nnp ' Defendant's positi :> 
reasoning of Oleson remains sound. In State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985), the 
defendant argued Hint his due process rights had been violated because of aprearrest 
delay. The crime with which defendant w as • ::! lai ged had taken place in \ i igi ist of 19 1 9, 
but the defendant was not arrested until 1983. I d at 282. In this case, the defendant's 
argument was rejected because the defendant was actually arrested very shortly after he 
was identified as the pcipiMiiilui I line WJS mn ILn I. (ill dmr diligrncc on the part of the 
police. IcL at 283-84. 
In State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50 (Utah App. 1996), this Court considered a similar 
iii(.»unK'iil in tin1 i unh nienLC charge. I he domestic violence incident 
had taken place two weeks prior to the defendant's arrest, and the State argued that the 
arrest was required under U.C.A. § 77-36-2 because the police were responding to a 
domestic violence call. Id at 53. In response to the defendant's arguments of delay, this 
Court held that where the police arrested defendant within 24 hours of the complaint, the 
response time was reasonable. Id. at 55. 
In contrast with the officers in Banks, Bailey, and Farrow, the Agents in the case 
at bar cannot show that they pursued this investigation with due diligence. The July 
meeting between Ms. Dutra, Defendant, and the unidentified third party was questionable 
at best, and the police did absolutely nothing to follow up and continue their 
investigation. If the July incident is deemed to have been sufficient to establish probable 
cause, Defendant should have been promptly arrested to give him adequate notice of the 
charges and ensure he had a full opportunity to investigate the incident himself, 
particularly regarding the involvement of the third person. 
Instead, the conduct of Agent Read is utterly lacking of any diligent investigation. 
The dubious information initially obtained had dried on the vine by the time Agent Read 
happened upon Defendant almost three months later. This is a significant delay, and the 
officers' failure to promptly pursue the investigation reduces what may have been 
probable cause at one point to merely a suspicious incident. 
IV. THE LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE ARREST 
RENDERS THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH INVALID. 
Where the officers had nothing beyond a suspicion that Defendant had committed 
an offense months earlier, the warrantless arrest was invalid. See State v. Harmon, 910 
14 
I1" Id 1 i""'»e I M)<)-L>()4(litnh ! ( ^ 5 ) For a search incident to arrest to be valid, the arrest 
ihclf iiiiiiii ,1 be ftistittcd In pioh;iMi wtuw State v. Vv hik ! ! 
"For a search incident to arrest to be constitutional, the underlying arrest must be lawful. 
" State v. Trane, 2002 Utah 97 at f 23, 57 P.3d 1052 (citing Ker v. California, 374 
IIS " I, -I I, N.< S i ( l(»(M, UN U \l 'Mil l%l)). MMWCVCI 11 an arrest violated a 
defendant's constitutional rights under either the Fourth Amendment oi the I Jtal i 
Constitution or was otherwise unlawful, then any evidence secured incident to that arrest 
l\"|)ii:aHy be «r,eluded limn ;i minimal trial pursuant to the exclusionary ruk ni 
(citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
\\L initial .,;v>p<,i Delendam ^ \ cluck violated the Fourth Amendment because 
there •  i •• ' . '. iiivr;.(ii»iili(iii lijii.l c^seiilicill) IH.YII 
terminated almost three months earlier, and the information was unreliable. Further, 
there was no prokn <k- cause to justify Defendant's arrest. The officers did not personally 
• •« *^"*•*• reliability in the statements 
of the confidential informant given that a third person was present, the confidential 
informant had a motive to lie, and the confidential informant was not thoroughly searched 
Irion lli</ iiieetiii" K m il (licit' weie piohahle cause lor an arrest at the beginning of 
July, by the time Defendant was stopped in September the infomiiilioii w v sink l»ni .HUM 
the arrest was not pursued with due diligence. 
1S 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully submits that the search of his 
person and vehicle following his arrest was invalid. This Court should reverse the lower 
court's denial of his Motion to Suppress all evidence discovered as a result of that search. 
DATED this / / day of May, 2004. 
CATHERINE S. CONKLIN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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1 do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed by first-class mail^postagc prquni 
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Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
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CATHERINE S. CONKLIN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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District Court's Findings 
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3 OIND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 




AZER FRANKLIN BILLS, . * Case No. 021904330 J\>\ | \ ^ 
Defendant. * Judge: Roger S. Dutson 
* 
This Court hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 1, 2002, Agent Ryan Read ("Agent Read") of the WMNSF arranged for a 
confidential informant ("CI") to purchase marijuana from the Defendant. Agent Read 
watched the CI throughout the entire transaction with the Defendant. 
2. Agent Todd Hardman ("Agent Hardman") of the WMNSF drove the CI to 645 North 
|\ I n i l H K ' III I t i ' i h ' t l I L' l l i M i I ' U l l l i ' i l III , i , | i l l i l i i , i | M l k l M " ' ,1 , (11 
The Defendant pulled into the parking lot in a black Izusu Amigo. The car is registered 
in the Defendant's name. 
The CI spoke to the passenger in the csir and then conducted the transaction with the 
Defendant. 
The CI returned to Agent Hardman's undercover vehicle and immediately gave him a 
baggie of marijuana. The CI said she/lie had purchased the marijuana from the 
Defendant. 
The Defendant was not arrested at that time. 
On September 17, 2002, Agent Read recognized the Defendant's vehicle traveling in the 
Ogden area. He believed the Defendant was driving the car. Agent Read requested 
dispatch run the license plate to obtain the registered owner information. 
The dispatcher confirmed the car was registered to the Defendant. 
After Agent Read received this information, he decided to stop the Defendant. They 
were in the area of 27th and Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. 
Agent Read approached the driver who he believed to be the Defendant and asked his 
name. The Defendant confirmed Agent Read's suspicion. 
Agent Read placed the Defendant under arrest for distributing marijuana on July 1, 2002. 
In a search incident to arrest, Agent Read found over one hundred grams of marijuana in 
the car. 
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13. The Defendant was Mirandized and waived his rights. Initially, the Defendant claimed 
the marijuana was for his personal use. He said he received it from a friend who owed 
him $600. When Agent Read confronted him about the July 1 sale of marijuana, the 
Defendant acknowledged that he sold the narcotics. He maintained that he was not 
currently involved in distribution activity. 
14. The Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
15. Agent Read is an experienced police officer. 
16. Although Agent Read did not see the drug transfer, this Court concludes that the 
circumstances indicate a transaction took place. 
17. Agent Read took all the necessary precautions to insure a valid controlled drug 
transaction. He listened as the call was made, he instituted procedures to protect the CI, 
he surveyed the CI's movements, and he obtained license plate information. 
18. The Court does not think the other person who arrived on the scene was involved in the 
drug transaction. The person was too far away from the CI to have conducted a 
transaction. 
19. The CI left with money and returned with only drugs. This Court concludes a drug 
transaction took place for purposes of making a probable cause determination. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Agent Read had sufficient probable cause to make an arrest based on his personal 
observations alone. The arrest was legally justified. 
3 
2. Utah law permits an officer to arrest a suspected felon without a warrant. 
3. The Court will not consider the weight or credibility of evidence or witnesses at this 
juncture in the proceedings. 
4. The delay between the drug transaction and the arrest was not unreasonable. Therefore, 
the officer was not obliged to obtain an arrest warrant. 
5. Agent Read did not have to establish an exigency before he was permitted to make a 
warrantless arrest of the Defendant. 
6. The Defendant was properly informed of his Miranda rights. 
7. Agent Read obtained a propenstatement from the Defendant following a Miranda waiver. 
DATED this l( ofM»Sy5o03. 
JUDGE y)GER S DUTSON 
Second Judicial District Court 
Approved as to form: 
Joseph W. O'Keefe Jr. 
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Appendix B 
Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
AZER FRANKLIN BILLS, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NO. 021904330 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
** *** 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON 
2525 GRANT AVENUE 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
OCTOBER 21, 2002 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MS. BRENDA BEATON 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. JOSEPH O'KEEFE 
COPY 
I N D E X 
WITNESS PAGE 
RYAN READ 
Direct Examination by Ms. Beaton 4 
Cross-examination by Mr. O'Keefe 35 
Redirect Examination by Ms. Beaton 53 
J 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE CLERK: What's the defendant's name? 
MR. OfKEEFE: Azure Bills. Do you have the file? 
THE CLERK: I donft. 
MR. O'KEEFE: You donft? For the record, your 
Honor, it's Case No. 021904330. 
THE COURT: And what's the defendant's name? 
MR. O'KEEFE: Azer, A-Z-E-R, Bills. Azer Franklin 
Bills, 
MS. BEATON: Just for the record, I'm handing 
defense counsel and I've handed the Court a copy of the 
amended information. Unfortunately, the amended information 
is still amended incorrectly. It's still supposed to be 
amended to two second degree felonies, one distribution of 
marijuana. The other count is possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana, it also is a second degree felony 
because the defendant has a prior conviction. I will file a 
clean copy after this hearing. Defense counsel said that 
they would waive the clean copy at this point in time. 
We also have a stipulation that, for the purposes of this 
hearing because I don't have a certified copy, there is 
actually — the defendant had entered a no-contest plea on 
January 24 of 2000 here in the Second District to dangerous 
drugs, Misdemeanor B. It was illegal possession or use of a 
controlled substance. The defendant was confined for 90 days 
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jail. He had a six-month probationary period and a $250 
fine, which I guess with the surcharge was $457, and he does 
have a prior conviction. For the purposes of this hearing, 
defense counsel is willing to stipulate to that. 
MR. O'KEEFE: Thatfs correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BEATON: With that, the State calls agent Ryan 
Read. 
RYAN BEAD, 
having been duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. EEATCN: 
Q. Please state your name and occupation. 
A. It's Ryan Read. I'm a deputy sheriff, Weber County 
Sheriff f s Department. 
Q. How long have you worked for Weber County Sheriff's 
Office? 
A. About almost seven years now. 
Q. Okay. And what is your current assignment? 
A. Currently assigned to the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force. 
Q. How long have you been assigned to the Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force? 
A. A little over a year now. 
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Q. Just one second. 
Do you have a copy of the lab results? 
A. No. 
MS. BEATON: This is going to be more difficult to 
do if we don't have that. I apologize, Judge. I thought I 
had a copy of that with me before we began this hearing. 
What do you want to do? 1 can continue it, we can do it 
on a different day or -- it happens to be marijuana. 
Obviously Ifve seen it a thousand times. 
MR. OfKEEFE: Urn... 
MS. BEATON: Judge, I don't want to put the defense 
attorney in a bad position, but for some reason I can't lay 
my hands on a tox report from the lab. 
MR. O'KEEFE: Your Honor, I hate to impose upon the 
court or my client a burden of another scheduled hearing, so 
for the purposes of this hearing, I suppose we will go ahead 
and stipulate that it is, in fact, marijuana. But — 
THE COURT: How would it be if — you don't need to 
do that. What if counsel submits to you a report that 
satisfies you and if for some reason you have any lingering 
concerns, we can reopen that later? 
MR. O'KEEFE: Very good. That's fine, your Honor. 
Thank you. 
MS. BEATON: Okay. Thank you, Judge. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Agent Read, are you the case agent 
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Well, let!s talk first about count 
of 2002, where were you that day? 
Ifm sorry. What was that? 
July 1st of two — excuse me. 
Yeah. 
Where were you? 
I was at work — where was I? 
Where were you that day, what 










informant in this case? 
And in employing that confidential 
make an arrangement for the confidentia 





Why was the defendant the target of 
Itfs one the confidential informant 




Okay. For purposes of — 
MS. BEATON: Can we have 
ibit No. 1. 
(BY MS. BEATON) How long did 




informant, did you 
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this investigation? 
said that she could 
marked as States!s 


























to make the argument that that's hearsay. There's no 
foundation of reliability on the confidential informant and 
it's certainly — if what she said is offered for the truth 
of the matter, then it is hearsay and I'll object to that. 
MS. BEATON: WelL, [ haven't introduced it. But at 
the time that I do introduce it, I think it's admissible 
under 1102. It allows officers to actually introduce 
statements of witnesses if they have been given the 
admonition at the top of their statement that indicates they 
could be prosecuted for perjury in the event — 
MR. O'KEEFE: Your Honor, I — I'm not disputing 
1102 or the statement at this point. I'm just objecting to 
what he said that she said at this point. He said that she 
told him — 
MS. BEATON: I don't think it — 
MR. O'KEEFE: — that she could do something. 
MS. BEATON: Well, maybe then I'm wrong as to why 
it's coming in. I don't think right now it's coming in for 
the truth of the matter asserted. It's coming in to 
determine what is it that Agent Read is going — what steps 
he's going to take — 
THE COURT: To explain what he did? 
MS. BEATON: Exactly. 
MR. O'KEEFE: Then I understand, your Honor. But my 
objection — if it's offered for the truth of the matter, 
1 then I object. 
2 THE COURT: I!ll allow it on the limited basis that 
3 it explains his subsequent conduct. 
4 MS. BEATON: Thank you. 
5 MR. O'KEEFE: Thank you. 
6 Q. (BY MS. BEATON) The confidential informant, what is her 
7 name? 
8 A- Jody Dutra. 
9 Q. So when you had this conversation with Ms. Dutra, she had 
10 indicated to you she could purchase what type of drug from 
11 the defendant? 
12 A. Marijuana. 
13 Q- Okay. And did you make arrangements then to conduct a 
14 controlled purchase of marijuana with this defendant? 
15 A. I did. 
16 Q- H o w did you go about doing that? 
17 A. First thing we did was when — I met with the 
18 confidential informant. I had the confidential informant 
19 call Mr. Bills by phone and request to purchase marijuana 
20 from him. He directed her to go to the Super Saver store — 
21 MR. OfKEEFE: I'm going to object, your Honor. Now, 
22 it's hearsay as to what my client — 
23 MS. BEATON: Give me just a minute to lay the 
24 foundation. 
25 Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Did you have an opportunity to listen to 
y 
the conversation as Ms. Dutra was calling 
that time to be Mr, Bills? 
A. I could just hear what she was saying. 
what Mr. Bills was saying. 
Q. 
who you believed at 
I couldn't hear 
She made a phone call then to an individual and made 














And you could hear her portion of the conversation but 
couldn't hear the portion of the conversation who was on 
other line? 
No. 
Were you doing anything to tape record that conversation? 
No. 
Okay. After Ms. Dutra gets off the phone, does she tell 
where this transaction is supposed to take place? 
Yeah. She says we have to go to the Super Saver to do 
buy. 
Was her comment about having to go to 
consistent with the conversation that she 
the Super Saver 
had had on the 
phone with this unknown person at the time? 
A. Yes. 
MR. OfKEEFE: Objection, calls --
this is all — 
off. 
- your Honor, I mean 
MS. BEATON: Just so we can establish why the 
Leer is going where he's going and why he thinks the 
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information is reliable. Itfs not coming in for the truth of 
the matter. 
MR. O'KEEFE: If that's it, then itfs okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, please. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Did you go to this particular area? 
A. Yes. After I — 
Q. Was — 
A. After I — after I did some other stuff with the CI. 
Q. Okay. When you went to this particular area, what's that 
address? 
A. It is 675 North Monroe. 
Q. Okay. And in going there, does all of this take place on 
July 1st of 2002? 
A. It does. 
Q. Okay. Before going to that location, you'd indicated 
that you took some additional steps with this confidential 
informant. What were those steps? 
A. Searched the confidential informant, made sure she was 
not carrying any contraband with her, provided her with an 
electronic listening device and with money. 
Q. With money provided from the Strike Force? 
A. Yes. 









Do you also have to search the car that she's driving in? 
No, because she was riding with an officer in our car. 
Okay. Who is the — 
Another Strike Force agent would be driving her in his 
Q. And who was that officer? 
A. That was Agent Todd Hardman. 
Q. After you do the searching, providing her the money and 
all of that at the scene, does she immediately get in the car 
with Detective Hardman? 
A. She does. 
Q. And do they go directly to the location that you thought 
that the transaction was going to take place? 
A. They do. 
Q. Is there any stopping taking place or anything of that 
nature? 
A. No. No other than normal traffic flow. I mean, they 
didn't stop at any stores or anything like that. They drove 
directly to the store. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to speak with Agent Hardman 
about whether or not the — the confidential informant was in 
the car with him had the ability to acquire any additional 
contraband from with inside the police vehicle? 
A. No. 
Q. No, you didn't talk to him and no — 
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A. Had she — had she — had I asked him that? No. I — 
no, she had not been able to acquire anything else from 
there. That's what he told me. 
Q. Okay. Did you also have an opportunity to conduct 
surveillance and go to the location of where this transaction 
took place? 
A. I did. 
Q. And in going there, did you see whether or not the 
confidential informant met up with anybody? 
A. I did. 
Q. Who did you see the confidential informant meet up with? 
A. Azer Bills. 
Q. At the time did you already know who Azer Bills was? 
A. No. 
Q. You hadnft had any prior police dealings with him? 
A. No, no. 
Q. Okay. And do you recognize the individual in the 
courtroom? You glanced over at him, do you recognize him as 
being the same person that you saw that day? 
A. I do. I do. 
Q. When the confidential informant gets out of the car, 
or — well, let me back up. 
How does the transaction take place when an Agent Hardman 
pulls up with the confidential informant in the car? 
A. The confidential informant and Hardman arrived there 
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before Azer did. They parked in the parking lot and it was 
probably — oh, let me see. See, they arrived there at 1756, 
so it was almost 10 minutes before Azer arrived. He pulled 
up in the black Amigo, parked about two spots to the north of 
where they were. The confidential informant got out and went 
out and met with Azer. He got out of the car and they met 
outside the car. 
Q. And from the vantage point where you were at, could you 
see an exchange take place between the two people? 
A. I couldn't see them handing hand-to-hand, no. I could 
see them standing by each other, but I never did actually see 
something handed from hand-to-hand. 
Q. You indicated that the confidential informant was wired 
at the time. Were you able to hear the conversation that the 
confidential informant is having with the defendant? 
A. Not clear enough that I could pick up any sort of 
conversation on them. 
Q. Do you attempt to tape record the conversation with this 
wiring device that you have? 
A. No, no. I — I — like I say, it was a bad reception 
between the — I could hear words. I could hear a female 
voice and a male voice, but what the conversation was, I 
couldn't tell. 
Q. And from your vantage point, could you see anybody in 




Q. Okay. At any point in time were there any other 
individuals who walked up during this transaction taking 
place? 
A. There was another female that pulled up in a car, never 
got out of the car, pulled up to where they were and then 
they was — they was standing here and the vehicle pulled up 
next to them. 
Q. Did you see any exchange taking place with this female 
who had pulled up and the defendant or the confidential 
informant? 
A. No. Nothing. 
Q. Okay. Were they in a position where there could have 
been a hand-to-hand exchange? Were the cars parked that 
close to people standing outside the car that somebody could 
have just handed somebody something? 
A. They were standing close enough that they could have but 
I would have see it and there was not. I was in a position 
where I could see that there was no exchange with the people 
inside the car and Azer and the confidential informant. 
Q. During any point between this transaction, did you ever 
lose sight of the defendant and the confidential informant? 
A. No. 
Q. About how long does this transaction take place? 
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A. It!s relatively short. I don't have the time that 
they — that she gets back in the car, but itfs Ifd say maybe 
two minutes at the most. It!s short. 
Q. Let's go back to when I was talking to you about the tape 
recording device. Youfd indicated that the tape recording 
device is not working. What is the reason that somebody — 
the confidential informant in this case, Ms. Dutra, is 
actually wearing this wiring device then? 
A. The electronic monitoring device is actually a safety 
device. It!s if something goes wrong we can hear that 
something is wrong and go to the — go to their assistance or 
their help. Unfortunately they don't always work very well. 
It's mostly a safety device so if somebody screams, we know. 
But a lot of time I can't make out conversation. It depends 
on different conditions and how far away I am and things like 
that. 
Q. Different conditions like the weather and that sort of — 
A. Yeah. Because it's a radio signal and, you know, 
depending on — I mean, I've been in places where I've been 
blocks away and had crystal-clear reception and done deals 
where I can't hardly understand across the room so — 
Q. In this particular case because the reception is bad, do 
you make that assessment and then you decide not to record? 
Or did you record and you listened to the quality of the tape 
and it's not — 
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A. I did not record it. I did not record it. 
Q. And so you knew that the reception was not going to be 
good even before you did the transaction? 
A. Well, when I was there I couldnft understand it or make 
anything out so — 
Q. So you elected not to record at that point? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. After this transaction takes place, does the 
confidential informant get back into Agent Hardman!s car? 
A. She does. 
Q. And then do you have a plan as to meet to a prearranged 
location? 
A. Yeah. Agent Hardman and the confidential informant drive 
to another location, then I met with him. 
Q. You met up with them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you do at that time? 
A. When we got there the CI — the confidential informant 
turned over to me the bag full of green leafy substance that 
they purchased from Azer and then I searched the CI to make 
sure hadn't — she didn't have any contraband on her. 
Q. How much money originally was she — 
A. $80. 
Q. — given to purchase that — 
A. $80. 
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Q. And did she spend all of the $80 on purchasing marijuana? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the bag that Ms. Dutra handed you consistent with 
what would be the going rate for $80 worth of marijuana? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the marijuana that you were looking at, had you seen 
marijuana in the past? 
A. I have. 
Q. Does marijuana have a certain sort of texture and 
appearance that make you believe that it was, in fact, 
marijuana? 
A. Yes. Marijuana has a distinctive smell and appearance 
and I recognized it as marijuana. 
Q. After Ms. Dutra hands you the $80 bag of marijuana, what 
else do you do? 
A. I searched her again, made sure she didnft have any other 
contraband on her and then had her fill out a statement for 
me. 
Q. Did she have any other sort of contraband on her? 
A. No. 
Q. And let me show you what13 been marked as State's No. 1. 
If I may approach and ask if you can identify what this is. 
A. This is a statement that Ms. Dutra filled out for me. 
Q. Were you present at the ti_me when she filled out this 
statement? 
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A. I was. 
Q. I notice there!s an admonition at the top, it indicates 
that she could be prosecuted for perjury if she were to lie 
on this particular form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make sure she would sign it and made sure she 
understood those provisions before writing out this 
statement? 
A. Yes. 
MS. BEATON: Let me show defense counsel what Ifve 
got as State's No. 1. I move for admission for what's been 
marked as State's No. 1. 
MR. O'KEEFE: Could I have one minute, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MR. O'KEEFE: Could I see that just one more time? 
I'm sorry, Brenda. 
Your Honor, I'm going to object only because I don't 
think it complies with Rule 8 A or B of 1102. Obviously it's 
not a statement that's sworn. It's a statement that does 
have an admonition in it but it seems to me that the 
admonition is if you lie in court, you could be punished, not 
for the statement itself. So I'll make my objection on those 
grounds, your Honor, and let the Court decide, I guess. I 
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particular case? 
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says, If you make false statements you could be subject to 
perjury. Itfs not a sworn statement so that in and of itself 
couldn't subject her to perjury. It certainly is — must be 
related to some kind of a sworn affidavit or a sworn 
statement. And the only time that she would be taking an 
oath or affirmation subjected to perjury would be on the 
stand that certainly wouldn't subject her to perjury, and it 
specifically says perjury so I don't think it qualifies. 
MS. BEATON: I think the argument that Mr. OfKeefe 
is making is, though, would follow the Rule of 1102 because 
the purpose of 1102 is to allow a particular witness to not 
appear if the officers go through and give somebody this 
admonition that they could be prosecuted for perjury. 
Now, if defense counsel says she has to get on the stand 
in order for a perjury conviction to actually take place, 
that would swallow the 1102 Rule. What she can actually be 
charged for is something akin to perjury which would be false 
report to an officer or something of that nature. But 
clearly that statute contemplated that witnesses would not 
have to appear, that officers could testify in their place if 
a witness gave a statement under this particular admonition. 
And so this admonition has been taken from case law, put on 
these particular forms and submitted to officers in order for 
them to in these type of situations arrange for a witness to 
not be present, but yet then the officer can testify that 
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they actually did and inform them of all of these sorts of 
things with the idea that we're getting a statement that a 
person believes that they could be convicted of a felony if 
they were to lie in this particular statement. 
Now what Mr. OfKeefe is staying as a practical matter is, 
well, shefs got to get on the stand in order to be charged 
with perjury. I don't think that!s a particular — I don't 
think that's the case. If she were to get on a stand at a 
later point in time in a further proceeding, for example, at 
trial where she would obviously be called as a witness to 
testify, if she testified inconsistent with this statement, 
she certainly could be charged with perjury. And what she's 
being told right now is you're giving this statement, we 
expect that the statement is truthful. And if you get on the 
stand at the time of trial and testify untruthfully, you at 
that point in time are subject to perjury and even at this 
point are subject to false statement to a police officer. 
THE COURT: Let me look at the rule, please. It's 
1102 what? 
MR. O'KEEFE: 8 A and B, your Honor. 
THE COURT: 8 A and B? Thank you. 
Here's what the rule says and you probably have a copy in 
front of you. It says, A statement of the declarant that is 
written — so that's satisfied, which is A — under oath or 
affirmation. I don't know that there's any oath that was 
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administered before this person filled this out. At least 
there's nothing that I recall or reading that would indicate 
that there was an oath. Maybe an affirmation. Ifm not sure 
what that really means. I mean, I think I do. But it says 
"or" so itfs in the disjunctive -- or pursuant to a 
notification to the declarant that a false statement made 
therein is punishable. Read again the statement to me 
please. 
MS. BEATON: It indicates: I, Jody Dutra, give this 
statement of my own free will and without duress. I 
understand that this statement will be used in the 
prosecution of the suspect listed in this case and will be 
used in court proceedings. I also understand if I gave false 
statements, I could be subject to criminal charges, including 
perjury. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, I suppose that if she is 
giving false information to a police officer, in other words, 
if that information contained is false information, she 
certainly could be punished. She could be punished with a 
misdemeanor charge. And so I think that that statement fits 
8 B; that is, made pursuant to a notification to the 
declarant that a false statement made therein is punishable. 
So Ifm going to allow it on that basis. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Agent Read, we're now going to turn to 
the events that took place on September — 
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waiving any right we may have 
Q. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Very well Thank 
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s case or do you 
with the same 
did you contact the 
24 
A. I did. 
Q. Why? 
A. I — the reason I contacted him was to arrest 
distribution of marijuana on the prior date. 
Q. That occurred on July 1st of 2002? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did you locate the defendant? 
A. I — actually, when I first saw him he was at 
and Gramercy and I actually saw the black Amigo. 
driving down the road and saw the black Amigo and 
of — I recognized it. 
him for the 
about 2 9th 
I was just 
it kind 
Q. You recognized that as being the same car as on the 
incident that occurred on July 1st? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. In recognizing that car, had you also at some 
determined who the owner was of the car? 
point 
A. Yeah. I had ran the — I asked dispatch to run the plate 
on the vehicle and it came back as Azer Bills. 
Q. The defendant again? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity then to actually i stop this 
car to determine if the person driving the car was again the 
defendant? 
A. I did. I stopped the vehicle. It was just — 
between 27th and Adams and Washington. 






























At the time were you in a marked police car? 
No. 
What were you driving? 
My Grand Am, the maroon Grand Am. 
Were you wearing street clothes? 
Yes. 
Q. Did you have something on you that identified you as a 
police officer? 
A. I had my badges on my belt that I was wearing, yeah. 
Q. In addition to that, did you have some sort of official 
lights or sirens on your car that you could activate in order 
to stop the car that the defendant was driving? 
A. Yeah. I have red and blue lights that I can put in my 
windshield. 
Q. And when you activated those red and blue lights, did the 
defendant stop immediately? 
A. He did. 
Q. He stopped in the area that you had indicated, and at 
that time, did you inform the defendant that you were going 
arrest him for the incident that took place on July 1st? 
A. When I walked up to the vehicle I believe I asked him for 
his identification. He said he didn't have any but when I 
was at the window I recognized him. I asked him to step out 
and placed him under arrest. 







But you recognized him as being 
















At some later point in time are 
the same person because 
took place of this drug 
you able 
identification from the defendant? 
to get some kind 
I donft think I ever did get any identification. 
Did he identify himself as Azer Bills to you by name? 
Yes. Yes, he stated his name was Azer Bills. 
And in doing that, did you explain to the defendant why 
were arresting him? 
I did. 
Did you have an opportunity to Mirandize 
speak to him regarding the offense? 
I did. 
the defendant 
After — when you Mirandized the defendant, did you do 




I did it from memory. 
When you asked the defendant — 
defendant all of his rights, did he 
A. 
Q. 
He stated he did. 
He stated he did? 
of those 
when you 
cards in your 
explained to the 
understand those rights? 
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A. He stated he did understand the rights. 
Q. And did you ask him if ever had any questions about any 
of those rights? 
A. Did I ask if he had any questions about those rights? I 
did not. 
Q. At any point in time from the time you're talking to the 
defendant, does he ever indicate to you that he has any 






Did you ask him if he was willing to speak to you? 
I did. 
And how did the defendant respond? 
He said he would talk to me. 
When you talked to him, did you have a conversation 
about — well, let's back up. 
Before you actually have this conversation with him, do 
you search him incident to the arrest that you're making? 
A. Him? Yes, I search him and his vehicle. 
Q. Do you find anything unusual either on the defendant or 
in his car? 
A. I did. I found a — I found a — in the center console 
between the two front seats I found a marijuana — what 
appeared to be a marijuana butt, a small butt of what I 
believed is marijuana, looked like and smelled like 
marijuana. Then in the — behind the passenger seat there 
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was a — I believe it was a Sprite. I think it was a Sprite 
in 12 pack boxes, it was a box. And inside the box was 
174.1 grams of a green leafy substance that smelled and 
appeared to be marijuana. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Then the rear of the vehicle behind a speaker I found 
another baggie of a green leafy substance that appeared to be 
marijuana. 
Q. Were there any other people in the car? 
A. Yes, there was. There was another individual in the car. 
Q. Who was that other individual? 
A. His name was James McPhie. I think that's how you 
pronounce it. 
Q. Where was Mr. McPhie riding at? 
A. Mr. McPhie was in the passenger seat, the front passenger 
seat. 
Q. Did you get an opportunity — you had indicated you got 
an opportunity to talk to the defendant and you Mirandized 
him. In what order does take place? Do you do the search 
and then Mirandize or the Mirandizing and then searching? 
A. I searched and then Mirandized. 
Q. Okay. When you Mirandized the defendant, did you discuss 
with him the contents of what you had found in the car? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did the defendant say? 
z^ 
A. He said that a friend of his owed him $60C 














you discuss with him the large amount 
I did, I did. 
How did the defendant respond to that? 
) and he 
of mari: 










Itfs too large of a quantity. ItTs way larger quantity 
n personal use, certainly much more than anybody would 
drive around with in their car. 
Q. What quantity — 
MR. OfKEEFE: Objection, your Honor. 
speculation. 
That1s 








THE COURT: Go ahead, then. 
MS. BEATON) Agent Read, how long did 
been working for the narcotics strike 





during that period of time, have you received 





you the types of quantities that ordinarily an individual 
would use as compared to individuals who actually distribute? 
A. I wouldn't say I!ve had any actual training as to what 
the amount is. It would be more just my experiences on the 
job of dealing with people that sell drugs and people that 
use drugs and the amounts that they're generally in 
possession of, most people. 
Q. So Ifm guessing that you worked approximately 40 hours a 
week? 
No, I wish. But — 
Q. Okay. Probably more? 
A. A lot more than that, yeah. 
Q. And the entire time your career basically of the last 
year has been spent just handling narcotics? 
A. Just narcotic cases. 
Q. What percentage of those cases would you estimate are 
dealing specifically with marijuana? 
A. Ifd say maybe 30 percent of the cases Ifve seen since 
being in narcotics have been marijuana. 
Q. And even before going the Strike Force, did you have to 
deal with individuals who were using or distributing 
marijuana? 
A. Yes. During — mostly user quantities as a patrol 
officer. 
Q. And approximately how many different people would you 
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estimate that you!ve dealt with that have been involved with 
marijuana use or marijuana distribution type cases? 
A. Use and — possession and distribution? 
Q. Sure. 
A. Hundreds. 
Q. Okay. And in those hundreds, have you been able to glean 
the sort of quantities that individuals will have when 
they're possessing it just for their own personal use? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What kind of quantities would somebody ordinarily have 
for their own personal use? 
A. I would say generally between Ifd say an eighth and a 
quarter of an ounce. At the very greatest an ounce. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. Continue, 
please. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) In this particular case — so clearly 
the defendant has more. Letfs say this defendant, though, 
has a particularly very bad problem with marijuana. If 
somebody has a very high addiction to marijuana, have you 
seen individuals that will have the quantities in which this 
defendant had? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. The street value of the amount of marijuana that 
this defendant had would be approximately what? 
A. That's hard to say. Marijuana — different qualities 
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is — methamphetamine is a little more — amount, this is how 
much it cost. Marijuana is so varied in the quality of it. 
This marijuana in my opinion was good quality marijuana. It 
was actually some really nice stuff so it was probably a 
little more expensive than what you usually find in town. I 
would bet this stuff probably between three to $400 an ounce 
and it was 174 grams, 28 grams in an ounce so --
MR. O'KEEFE: Six. 
THE WITNESS: Six? Thank you. 
MR. O'KEEFE: Thought Ifd save some time, your 
Honor. 
THE WITNESS: Around 6 ounces, so I would say three 
to $400 an ounce. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) So approximately $1,800 worth of 
marijuana here? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Now, at the time that you booked the defendant in, did he 
indicate that he had a job at the time or an employer that 
you could list for booking purposes? 
A. Yeah, he did. He said he worked for — itfs a car 
detail, Classic Auto Spa. 
Q. Okay. Letfs — 
A. That's just a question they asked on the booking. 
Q. Okay. Sorry. I just got a different piece of paper in 
my hand. 
JJ 
After you found that type of quantity and the defendant 
said this was for his personal use, did you confront him with 
the facts that you didn't beLieve that that's what he was 
doing with marijuana generalLy? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. And what did the defendant say? 
A. He just — he just said it was for his own personal use. 
I says, you know, there's no way, it's way too much. I said 
you wouldn't be driving around with it, you know, with that 
much and he just kept it up that this was just for his 
personal use. 
Q. Did you confront him with the deal that had taken place 
on July 1st, 2002? 
A. I did. 
Q. At the time that you confronted the defendant what did he 
say? 
A. At first he denied that he'd sold marijuana to anybody. 
Q. Then what did you say? 
A. I told him — I reminded him of some of the things. In 
fact, I told him that I watched him. I told him it was from 
Jody Dutra, that when he came in the car with the other white 
guy they met at the Super Saver. And then his response to 
that was, Well, that was months ago. 
Q. That's what he said? 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. Okay. And did he then at that time that point admit, in 
fact, that he did distribute to her? 
A. He said — he said — he said that he had not sold 
marijuana for a couple of months, even then it was just to a 
couple of friends. He never actually said that he came and 
sold to Jody Dutra, no. 
Q. Did he consider Jody Dutra to be one of his pals that he 
was selling to? 
A. He — I think he said he — 
MR. O'KEEFE: Object. Calls for speculation unless 
therefs some foundation. 
MS. BEATON: Well, he!s talked about his friends 
that hefs selling to. Ifm just wondering if he classifies — 
THE COURT: Repeat the question. Are you asking him 
to speculate about what this person thinks? 
MS. BEATON: No. Ifm asking whether or not when he 
said that he was selling just to a few friends, whether or 
not he lumps Jody Dutra into that category or whether or not 
she was just a customer. 
MR. O'KEEFE: Well, your Honor, the only way he can 
answer that is a, hearsay — 
MS. BEATON: Judge, just strike it. It doesn't make 
a difference. 
THE COURT: I would say it is speculation. 
MS. BEATON: State rests. 
J3 
THE COURT: You may cross. 
MR. OfKEEFE: Thank you, your Honor. 
C3OS5S-EXAMINATI0N 








Detective, we'll go back to the first one first. Okay? 
Okay. 




Okay. And how did you first come to get acquainted with 
Ms. Dutra? 
A. The first time I met her actually face-to-face was when 
we served a search warrant on her house. 
Q. On her home? And how long before this did that occur? 
A. I donft know exactly. It was — I'm going to guess and 
say it was maybe six months prior. 
Q. Okay. And was Ms. Dutra living alone at the time? 
A. At the house we did the search warrant? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. No. 
Q. Who was she living with? 
A. I don't remember their name. It was some friends, it 
wasn't family. I know it was some friends. 
Q. I see. Do you — just going to in one of your reports 
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you mention a person named Antoine. Do you know Antoine? 
A. Yeah. Antoine is her boyfriend. 
Q. What would his last name be? 
A. I can!t remember. Azer should know. Azer — they was 
friends in high school. 
Q. Okay. 




Q. Okay. So this confidential informant you did a search 









We did. We found methamphetamine in her house. 
Methamphetamine. So did you arrest her? 
Not at that time. 
Did you ever arrest her? 
Yes. 
For the possession of methamphetamine? 
Yes. 
Q. How long after that was she arrested? How long after the 
search warrant? 
A. It was several months later. 
Q. Okay. And was she working as a confidential informant 
for you out of the goodness of her heart? 
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A. No. 
Q. Well, why was she working for you then? 
A. She was on a contract to have her charges reduced. 
Q. Okay. And so she named all these people that she could 
allegedly make buys from and then if she completed her 
contract, then you were going to charge her with some lesser 
offense? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you said — you indicated that you charged her with 
possession of methamphetamine, was that a lesser offense then 
she would have ordinarily be charged with? 
A. Was that a less -- she -- could you repeat that? Ifm not 
sure that I — 
Q. You indicated to the Court just now that you ended up — 
you did charge her, you ended up charging her with a crime? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you indicated to the Court that you when you served 
the search warrant on her home you found methamphetamine? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you charged her with possession of 
methamphetamine ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that a lesser crime then you could have charged her 
with? 
A. I think actually she was charged with possession with 
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intent to distribute. 
Q. Did she complete her contract? 
A. She did. 
Q. So her contract generally was if you help us bust X 
amount of people, then you will get a lesser offense? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you ever arrest Antoine Bell? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Do you know whether or not he was arrested? 
A. I do. 
Q. Was he arrested? 
A. He was. 
Q. Was part of -- was part of Ms. Dutrafs deal have anything 
to do with your prosecution or charging Antoine Bell? 
A. No. 
Q. He was on his own? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he ever work for you? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, on the night or the day, what time of the day was it 
that you indicate to the Court that Ms. Dutra made a phone 
call to someone? 
A. Let's see, I met with — the first time I have logged on 
my report is 1751 which was 5:51, that's when I searched the 
confidential informant. So the phone call would have been, 
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you know, a few minutes before then. 
Q. Okay. How did Ms. Dutra get to that meeting? 
A. I picked her up. 
Q. You picked her up? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Okay. And Detective Hardman met you wherever you met? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is Detective Hardman a man or a woman? 
A. A man. 
Q. Now you indicated that -- oh, first of all, where did you 
pick up Ms. Dutra? Do you recall? 
A. Yeah. It was the area of 24th and Adams. 
Q. Okay. And she got in your car and you drove her to this 
place and you met with Detective Hardman? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you picked her up, did you search her? 
A. Not when I picked her up, no. 
Q. And then in the office she makes the phone call — 
A. We didn't go to the office. 
Q. Wherever — Ifm — all right. Wherever you went and Ifm 
not trying to get that from you. 
A. All right. 




Q. Okay. This place that you were, how long was she in the 







How long was she in this place before I searched her? 
Yeah. 
Well, she was inside my car from the time I picked her up 
the area of 24th and Adams, then we drove out into a 
king lot of North Ogden. Then we made the call from my 





No. No. Wherever you made this phone call from — 
Okay. 
You picked her up and you went to this place where the 











No. It was the front seat of my car. 
So you made the phone call from the front seat of your 
? 
Uh-huh. 
And so if I understand you correctly, you and Detective 




No. No, the phone call was made in the front seat of my 
Okay. 
1 A. Then we get out of my car in the parking lot, I search 
2 her. Then she gets into the car with Hardman, Hardman is in 
3 the parking lot. 
4 Q. Okay. So Ifm assuming you're in a public parking lot 
5 someplace and you search her. 
6 A- It's a public parking lot but itfs not — itfs hidden 
7 I from view. 
8 Q. I see. Would you please explain how two men search a 
9 female in the daylight in a police car effectively. 
10 A. Well, we're not in police — we're not in marked units. 
11 I There's not two men searching her. Me, not me and Hardman. 
12 And I searched her, made sure she had nothing in her pockets, 
13 J nothing in her — I asked her to pull out her bra and shake 
14 it so if anything was in her bra it would fall out, in her 
15 J socks, in her shoes, anywhere she could hide something. 
16 Q- Did you pat her down? 
17 A. Yeah. 
18 Q. You patted her down? 
19 A. Well, I didn't pat her down. I put my hands in her 
20 pockets and made sure nothing was in her pockets. 
21 Q. Did you pat her groin area down? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did you have access to a female police officer that could 
24 have came and conducted a more thorough test? 






a cavity search I guess but — 
Well, how long have you been a pol 
Seven years. 
You're quite aware that people car 









Okay. Ten grams. 




about a plastic 
Now, would 
That would be about that much 
Is it — 
MS. BEATON: Maybe if we 




(BY MR. O'KEEFE) 
person? 
A. If somebody tried 





(BY MR. O'KEEFE) 






L hide guns and escape a 
baggie of $80 worth of 
just show the Court how 
i bag. 
could just state for the 
and how far long? 
inches long. 
Relatively easy to hide on somebody's 
to hide it in their crotch, yeah, they 
t in there. 
Okay. Now, if 
Officer, without 
, would you -just 
I may, your Honor, 
: getting into any scale 





king lot of this place you were staking out and the 
ative positions of the vehicles. 
Is there — 
THE BAILIFF: I got one. 
MR. OfKEEFE: Sorry. 








(BY MR. OfKEEFE) This would be what? 
675 North. 
675 North. 
I think therefs a — as a matter of fact, I think --I'll 
the intersection in. This is 675 North. And then the 
re sits at a bit of an angle, it's not squared up on the 












king stalls here out front and about like that. 
Okay. And can you tell me where Detective Hardman parked 
vehicle? 
He parked right over here. Itfs actually — this isn't 
scale. 
I understand that. It's fine. 
It was over here on the — 
Can you tell me where you were parked? 
I was parked right here. 
Can you tell me where the Amigo pulled into? 
Amigo pulled in about — it was two or three, I believe 
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it was two stalls over because there was a big white van 1 












11 just put it there. 
Okay. And as I understand your testimony the — 
Dutra got out of the detective's vehicle — 
Uh-huh. 
— walked over to the Amigo? 
Yeah. 
Did Mr. Bills stay in the Amigo or did he get out? 
No, he got out. 
Where did they go when they got out? 
Right here. 
Okay. Now you indicated that there was another vehicle 










Where did that park? 
Pulled up about right here. 
Did they stay there or did they walk over to the vehicle? 
They stayed about this general area. 
Did she get out of the vehicle? 
No. 
So between the two of them I thought you testified there 
could have been an exchange, but there wasn't. It doesn't 
look like there could have been an exchange. 
A. Like I said, I think within the realm of — could they 
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have passed something, yeah. Did they? No. 
Q. So it's a little bit closer than what you've diagramed 
there? 
A. Yeah. Within this general area, yes. 
Q. Were there any other vehicles parked in these stalls? 
A. These stalls over here? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I don't know for sure but I don't remember there being 
vehicles there. It seemed like the parking lot was pretty 
much empty. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. You can have a seat again, please. 
THE DEFENDANT: That other car right here was parked 
next — 
MR. O'KEEFE: Shhh — all right. 
Q. (BY MR. O'KEEFE) You wouldn't know when the last time 
Detective Hardman searched his police vehicle to determine 
whether or not anything had been in there — 
A. No. 
Q. — stashed by anybody? 
A. No. The vehicle he was driving we don't use for — we 
don't use it for normal -- our normal police operations. 
Only time it's used is for undercover buys. 
Q. I see. So it would be not unusual if people who had 
drugs would be sitting in that position for at least — 
A. People that — people that we had driven to purchase 
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drugs would be si .tting in that seat, yeah. Those drugs 
they're purchased are placed into evidence. 
Q. All right. Now, you say you wired her up for some 










And you were 
t tape record the conversation. 
after 
just listening to it and you couldn't make 
what was being said? 
Yes, sir. 
And you said 
king anyway. 
Did I expect 
that you expected that because it wasn 
it? 






Did you ever 
works; sometimes it doesn't. 
tell the CI that you might not be able 
r what was she was saying so if she got in trouble s'. 












m a little bit mystified by one thing. 
the 1st of July, correct? 
So you had two-plus months to present your evidence 
istrate and ask for a search — or an arrest warrant 










Q. Did you ever contact the prosecuting attorney's office to 
determine whether or not they had enough sufficient 
information to file a complaint? 
A. Informally I talked to a prosecutor about these cases. 
Q. And what were you told? 
A. On this particular case? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. That the charge could be filed. 
Q. So why didnft you seek an arrest warrant? 
A. I donft know. I didn't know when I would be making this 
arrest — or I mean, when this when this entire was case was 
over with, I would make an arrest. I didn't know when that 
would be. 
Q. So you just — never mind. 
Jumping ahead a little bit when we get into that second 
case, the conversation you had relevant to this particular 
case with Mr. Bills was that he never admitted that he sold 
anything to Ms. Dutra, did he? 
A. When I asked him about it he said -- his statement to 
that was, Well, that was months ago. 
Q. But he never admitted that he sold anything of an illegal 
nature, correct? 
A. I think that's an admission to me. 
Q. Okay. So you're surmising then when he says that's 
months ago, he was talking something about a unlawful deal 
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rather than I met her months ago? 
A. 
you 
No. When I talked to him about selling 
L know, at this place, at this time, with 




an admission to selling marijuana. 
marijuana to her, 
these people 
ago, I take that 
Okay. Back to your diagram. How far away from Mr. Bills 
you think you were when this transaction, 
transaction occurred? 
A. I apologize. I'm really poor at this. 
alleged 
I'm better at 






yards I'm away. 
And from 50 yards away you're confident 
i individual you saw? 
Oh, definitely. 
When you walked up to his car the night 
that Mr. Bills is 
— or when you 








I might have. 
Well, if you knew him to be Azer, why would you ask him? 
Just to confirm. 
I see. 
There's probably more than one person in the world that 
>ks like Azer. 
So when you pulled him over you weren't quite sure that 
this was the guy that you saw in the parking lot? 




Okay. Let's go to the second one, then. 
MR. O'KEEFE: It's been a long time, your Honor, 





(BY MR. O' 
know what 
KEEFE) We used to ca 
a lid is when talking 
I don't know how much it is but 















about — I don't want 
ounce. 
We used to call them lids. It 
ked like a 
Okay. 
Would you 







And is it 
big cigar. 
consider — but there 
re talking about when 
— 174 grams, you're 
good sized packages, 
your testimony that a 




No, it's not your testimony? 
11 these things lids. Do 
about marijuana? 
I've heard the term of 
to give testimony but 
looked like a long — it 
's only 16 of them in a 
you say 174, are you 
talking about six ounces 
correct? 
person wouldn't buy that 
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No. Nobody would buy 174 grams of marijuana for personal 
use. 
Q. You're sure of that? 
A. I!m confident. 
Q. Have you ever arrested a doctor for utilizing marijuana? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever arrested anybody that lived up above the 
college — 
MS. BEATON: Objection, relevance, 
MR. OfKEEFE: Well, your Honor, itfs his experience 
that we're talking — she brought it up and opened the door. 
I mean, if we're talking about street crime then maybe he's 
true. But if he hasn't investigated everybody that buys 
marijuana, then it's probably not true. I have a right to 
explore that. 
MS. BEATON: Well, but aren't we also kind of 
talking about apples and oranges? I mean, we are a talking 
about a guy who washes cars for a living. We're not taking 
about, you know, a doctor who lives up on the east bench. 
MR. O'KEEFE: We're talking about whether or not an 
individual would have a 174 grams for personal use, period. 
And if that person — if a person would do that, then it's 
only this officer's opinion that the State offers that's 
sufficient to bind my client over on possession with intent. 
I have an obvious right to explore it. 
SI 
THE COURT: 





















That may be a very good argument at 
you're dealing with the burden of proof, 
a reasonable doubt, but for a preliminary 
I'm required to draw all inferences in favor of 



















Well, it is obviously it's not — 
And it's after five. 
And it is after five. Omen versus 
part of the reason for preliminary 
Oh, I acknowledge. And if you're — if 
> to see what you can develop at trial, 
But your argument a minute ago — 
Right. 
— was really talking about a bind over 
remind you about what the quantum of 
for a preliminary hearing. 
0'KEEFE: I understand, your Honor. But at this 







If you are developing this for trial, 
as a discovery tool, then that's fair 
Thank you, your Honor. 
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Q. (BY MR. OfKEEFE) So again, you've never heard in your 
police career of anybody — anybody at all buying a quarter 
pound for personal use? 
A. No. 
Q. And you!ve done this for how long? 
A. Law enforcement? 
Q. Undercover or narcotics or whatever. 
A. Narcotics, a little over a year. 
y. Okay. So at the time it was about a half year? 
A. No. It was actually a year. 
y. Then or now? 
A. A year when we did this buy, but a year and two months 
when I made this arrest. 
Q. Thank you. 
Now, let me ask you this: Are there written reports back 







Is there written reports there? 
Yeah. Do they still have things called T cases? 
Yeah, we still do T cases. 
And do you still document every contact with individuals? 
Do we document a T case every contact of every 
individuals? No. 
Q. When you go over a T Case with somebody don!t you 
document each time that you've had contact with them? 
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A. If we do a report. A T case now is generally information 
called in by a citizen making a complaint on a — 
Q. When you open an investigation on an individual, what's 
that called? 
A. A case. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's what this is. 
Q. But you would keep these case files at Weber-Morgan; they 
wouldn't be at Ogden City, correct? 
A. I — I don't know what the process — I think they keep 
them here, yeah, but I'm not sure what they do with them. 
Q. Would there also be a file or a case on Ms. Dutra? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
MR. O'KEEFE: I don't have anything further, your 
Honor. 
MS. BEATON: Judge, maybe just we could have the 
agent diagram — give us the exact quadrants of where we're 
at, what business this is so we can mark it, put it into 
evidence. You want it marked as defense Exhibit 1? 
MR. O'KEEFE: Yeah, that's fine. 
THE WITNESS: 67 5 North. This is Monroe. 
REDIRECT EXZMENZVTICN 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. What business is this? 





Okay. You're — if you'll just mark that that's your 
Maybe if you just put your name next to it. Why don't 
put Agent Hardman's name next to his car where the CI 
came out of. If you 
defendant's car. 
What kind of car 
would mark van for the van. 
was this that pulled up, if 
We'll just say visitor. 
A . 
Q. 
I think it was a Mustang. 







on it at 
And then the circle that you have, if you would just 
indicate that was the location where you saw the 
take place. 
A. (Witness indicati 
MR. O'KEEFE: 












Objection, your Honor, to 
there was no evidence that 
Well, I guess — 
What I think what she means 
The two met. 
transaction 
that. As I 
he actually 
is where 
— she saw the two get together that 
— 
Well, then because this may be offered 
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in evidence to the jury, then Ifd like -
of it crossed out. 
MS. BEATON: 































I donf t know that 
change it to meetii 
: Thatfs fine. 
Okay. Okay. 
And then, Judge, -
Exhibit No. 1, whi< 
the transaction aspect 
transaction is a — 
qg. 
the State moves for 
h^ I donft know if I 
: I111 move for admission of Defense 1, 
It!s received. 
Okay. Thank you. 
Thank you. 
: We have no — we 
Thank you. Do you 
Yes. 
We submit, your , 
Okay. The Court f 





a prior convictions. 
nging to distribute 
degree felony based 
With that, the State 
!11 we rest, your 
both submit it? 
Honor. 
inds probable cause 
the crime of 
a controlled 
on the stipulation of 
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The Court also makes the finding of probable cause that 
the defendant committed the crime of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute with a prior 
conviction, also a second degree felony. 
Do you want to arraign him here or do you want — 
MR. OfKEEFE: That's probably best, your Honor. 
THE CLERK: They're ready for you downstairs. It's 
actually close to being done. 
MR. O'KEKKE: Are they ready? Okay. We'll go back 
down there. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, do you want us to rip that 
off for the file or — 
THE COURT: Why don't one of you tear it off, if you 
don't mind, and just take down with you to Judge Dutson's 
courtroom. 
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